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The Supreme Court Participates in Patent
Reform: Judicial Case Management
Aaron Dilbeck*
ABSTRACT
Last year, the Supreme Court became heavily involved in patent
law. The Supreme Court issued opinions on six substantive patent
law issues from 2014 to 2015. In their decisions, the Court con-
sistently denied the existence of weak patents. While the non-prac-
ticing entity is not necessarily a bad business model, the Supreme
Court seems focused on deterring business entities from prevent-
ing innovation through the assertion of weak patents. This Com-
ment will address how the Supreme Court became involved in the
patent reform doctrine to make patent law less burdensome to the
general business owner. Moving forward, the Supreme Court
needs to be weary of hindering future innovation, of its impact on
the small business owner, and realize that the greater picture re-
quires a more finessed approach to reform.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court issued an unusual number of patent law opinions
within a twelve-month period, starting on January 22, 2014.1 In five of the
six of the patent law questions, the Supreme Court reversed the rulings of the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.2 The Supreme Court's recent involvement
in these patent issues exemplifies the growing trend of its oversight of patent
law issues. 3
* Aaron Dilbeck is a 2016 candidate for Doctor of Jurisprudence from Southern
Methodist University Dedman School of Law. He would like to thank everyone
that contributed support and encouragement during his personal and profes-
sional development.
1. See Juliana Kenny, Supreme Court IP hearings at an all-time high, INSIDE
COUNSEL (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2014/02/28/supreme-
court-ip-hearings-at-an-all-time-high.
2. For purposes of this Comment, Octane Fitness LLC and Medtronic Inc. will be
considered to have addressed the same patent law question.
3. See Gene Quinn, Patent and IP Wishes for 2015, IP WATCHDOG (Jan. 4, 2015),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/01/04/patent-and-ip-wishes-for-2015/id=527
38/; see also Paul Conover & Phillip Nelson, The U.S. Supreme Court's In-
creasing Involvement In Patent Law, KNOBBE MARTENS (Dec. 26, 2014), http://
knobbe.com/news/2014/12/us-supreme-court%E2%80%99s-increasing-involve
ment-patent-law-corporate-l ivewire.
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The passage of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) in 2011
involved all branches of government. 4 The AIA went into effect on March
16, 2013.5 The AIA sought to correct problems with the system that had not
seen substantial reforms for thirty years. 6 The former system made patents
less transparent as to their validity, length, and scope.7 In an attempt to speed
up the patenting process and reduce the strain of litigation, the government
implemented the AIA.8
However, many members of the public alleged that the AIA did not go
far enough to address the perceived problems with the field of patents, prima-
rily problems involving non-practicing entities (NPEs).9 Several legislators
and practitioners shared these concerns.' 0 Even some legal scholars accused
the current patent system of placing too great of a burden on the field of
technology." More specifically, some legal scholars assert that patent hold-
ing entities place an unjustifiable burden on the technological industry.12
These public and legal scholars call patent holding entities many names, in-
cluding patent trolls, NPEs, and patent assertion entities.13 Legal scholars
4. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
5. See Summary of the America Invents Act, AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW
Ass'N (Oct. 13, 2015, 12:49 PM), http://www.aipla.org/advocacy/congress/aia/
Pages/summary.aspx.
6. See Robert A. Armitage, Understanding the America Invents Act and Its Impli-
cations for Patenting, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 6-8 (2012).
7. See id.
8. See President Obama Signs America Invents Act, Overhauling the Patent Sys-
tem to Stimulate Economic Growth, and Announces New Steps to Help Entre-
preneurs Create Jobs, THE WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.white
house.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/president-obama-signs-america-invents-
act-overhauling-patent-system-stim.
9. See Jess Collen, Patent Reform 2013-The "America Invents Act"-Much Ado,
FORBES (Mar. 15, 2013, 10:18 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jesscollen/
2013/03/15/patent-reform-2013-the-america-invents-act-much-ado/.
10. See Dennis Crouch, Professor-to-Professor: You Are Wrong about Patent Re-
form, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 10, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/03/pro
fessor-patent-reform.html; Do The Proposed AIA Rule Changes Go Far
Enough?, LAW 360 (Aug. 29, 2015, 9:34 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles
/696040/do-the-proposed-aia-rule-changes-go-far-enough.
11. See Richard Posner, Do patent and copyright law restrict competition and cre-
ativity excessively?, THE BECKER-POSNER BLOG (Sept. 30, 2012, 10:30 PM),
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2012/09/do-patent-and-copyright-law-re
strict-competition-and-creativity-excessively-posner.html.
12. See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs From NPE Disputes,
99 CORNELL L. REV. 387, 412 (2014).
13. For purposes of this Comment, NPEs will only be further classified as harmful
NPEs or beneficial NPEs.
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recognize that certain names-i.e. patent trolls and patent assertion entities-
evoke bias.14 Often, the media incorrectly portrays an NPE as a patent troll.'5
Non-practicing entities "do not manufacture products themselves . . . [and]
purchase patents from others."16 Therefore, NPEs do not utilize the technol-
ogy that they have patented.
In theory, the NPE is not bad for innovation.17 Foreseeably, NPEs could
advocate for an inventor because industry giants ignore inventors.' 8 NPEs
license patents to other companies without any threat of litigation.19 An NPE
likely has a better bargaining position than a sole inventor.20 This better posi-
tion allows the inventor to participate in arm's length negotiations. Very few
people believe that an individual inventor attempting to assert his patent may
do so successfully. However, it is possible for some patents to be enforced by
individual inventors. For example, some individuals assert relatively weak
patents-patents that are likely invalid or likely not infringed-against busi-
nesses purely for monetary gain.21 Legal scholars and economists have failed
to produce an undisputed estimate for the cost of this problem.2 2
In general, patent litigation has increased substantially over the past dec-
ade.23 NPEs likely caused a large portion of this increase.24 This Comment
14. See Exec. Office of the President, Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation (2013),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent-report.pdf.
15. See David Goldman, Patent trolls cost inventors half a trillion dollars, CNN
MONEY (Sept. 21, 2011, 5:19 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/09/21/technol
ogy/patent trollcost/.
16. David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Enti-
ties in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 426 (2014).
17. See Colleen V. Chien, Holding Up and Holding Out, 21 MicH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 1, 27 (2014).
18. See Dennis Crouch, Analyzing the Role of NPEs in the Patent System, PA-




21. See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 12, at 412.
22. See id. at 389 (Cost is $29 billion, previous estimate was $80 billion); see also
Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 16, at 434 ("First, we believe that Bessen and
Meurer's estimate is likely biased to be very high ... We find flaws with both
the survey and the subsequent extrapolation").
23. See An Increase in Patent Litigation? Or the AIA Working as Intended?, IP
NAV BLOG (Nov. 15, 2014), http://www.ipnav.com/blog/an-increase-in-patent-
litigation-or-the-aia-working-as-intended.
24. See Stephanie A. Quick, NPEs continue to play large role in patent litigation,
LEXOLOGY (Aug.17, 2014), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=
C7580c If-I fda-4c3c-9cd5-4caf276840c5.
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will address the current state of the law and the perception of patent law in
Part II. Part III will analyze the law's evolution and Part IV will identify
further steps the Supreme Court could take in the future. The Comment will
then conclude and identify concerns going forward.
II. PERCEPTION AND THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
Generally, patent law exists in a state of flux. Congress and the Supreme
Court made major substantive changes to patent law within the last five
years. Critics perceive25 that NPEs negatively affect every business that oper-
ates in any digital technology. 26 As a result of the widespread fear of NPEs,
Congress has begun to consider legislation that will mitigate the litigation
costs faced by prospective defendants.27 While Congress's changes to patent
law have been more substantial, the Supreme Court's changes are even more
numerous.
28
A. Supreme Court Decisions over the Past Year
From January 2014-February 2015, the Supreme Court produced
seven major patent opinions. The seven patent cases discussed in the last year
primarily addressed six patent law issues, including: (1) burden of proof in a
declaratory judgment action; (2) attorney's fees; (3) liability for indirect in-
fringement; (4) definiteness test; (5) patent eligible subject matter; and (6)
claim construction. In all six topics, the Supreme Court overturned rulings of
the Federal Circuit in favor of patent litigation.29 Forty-seven percent of the
Federal Circuit's caseload involves patent law.3 0
i. Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC
The first case addressed by the Supreme Court was Medtronic, Inc. v.
Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC. That case was between Medtronic, Inc.
(Medtronic) and Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC (Mirowski), companies
25. This Comment will not address whether the perceived negative effects have
been realized.
26. See Mary Juetten, Combat Your Fear of Non-Practicing Entities, FORBES (Oct.
31, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/maryjuetten/2014/10/31/
combat-your-fear-of-non-practicing-entities.
27. See Jeffrey W. Childers & Ryan K. Simmons, 2013 Dramatically Altered the
Landscape of the U.S. Patent System . . So What's Next In 2014?, WARD AND
SMITH, P.A. (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.wardandsmith.com/articles/2014-US-
patent-system-whats-next#.VNvYYi6zuFL.
28. See id.
29. See infra Sections Ai-ii.
30. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Appeals Filed, by Cate-




that both manufacture and sell medical devices.31 Mirowski owned several
medical devices patents and licensed Medtronic to use a select group of
them.32 Under the agreement, Mirowski would provide notice if Medtronic
infringed upon any other patents held by Mirowski and not covered under the
license agreement. 33 When such a notice was given, Medtronic was permitted
to either pay royalties or challenge the infringement allegation.34 Eventually,
Mirowski gave notice, claiming that several new Medtronic products in-
fringed upon Mirowski's patent portfolio.35 Medtronic challenged the in-
fringement claim by filing a declaratory judgment action.36
The Federal Circuit reversed the District of Delaware, leaving the Su-
preme Court to determine which party appropriately bears the burden of
proof.37 In its holding, the district court placed the burden of proof on the
patent owner.38 As such, Mirowski lost in the district court for failing to meet
its burden.39 However, on appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that
the declaratory judgment plaintiff, when also a licensee, bears the burden of
proving non-infringement.40 Because Medtronic failed to prove non-infringe-
ment, the Federal Circuit reversed in favor of Mirowski.41
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a declara-
tory judgment action causes the burden of proof to shift from the patentee to
the declaratory judgment plaintiff.42 The Court held that the burden lies with
Mirowski, the patentee, because substantive rights are unchanged when
bringing a declaratory judgment action.43 The Supreme Court supported the
decision, citing three practical concerns with shifting the burden: (1) the shift
could create post-litigation uncertainty about the scope of the patent; (2) the
alleged infringer would likely continue its actions; and (3) the patentee could
avoid having the burden of proving infringement by using a decision from a
declaratory infringement action in another suit.44 The chance of increased




34. See id. at 847.
35. Id.
36. Id.





42. Id. at 846.
43. See Medtronic, 134 S. Ct. at 849.
44. See id. at 849-50.
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litigation costs is not a concern for the Supreme Court because "litigation can
only occur in the presence of a genuine dispute."45 The public's interest is
well served by the Supreme Court's holding because a patentee cannot ex-
pand royalties for an idea beyond the legitimate scope of the patent; licensees
are often in the best position to challenge the scope of the patent.46
ii. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. and
Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management Systems,
Inc.
The Supreme Court examined the grant of attorney's fees in two cases. 47
Prior to the Patent Act of 1946, a court could not grant attorney's fees in a
patent litigation case.48 In the 1946 Patent Act, Congress granted to district
courts the discretionary power to award attorney's fees.49 Congress later re-
codified this provision in the 1952 Patent Act, empowering district courts to
award attorney's fees "'in exceptional cases.'"50 The Supreme Court held
that the recodification did not alter the meaning of the previous Patent Act.51
In 2005, the Federal Circuit adopted a controversially narrow definition of an
exceptional case.52 The Supreme Court reviewed these issues de novo. 53
In the first case, ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. (ICON) owned a patent
covering an adjustable elliptical exercise machine.54 Although ICON never
sold the patented equipment,55 ICON sued Octane Fitness, LLC (Octane) for
manufacturing and selling two elliptical exercise machines that allegedly in-
fringed upon ICON's patent.56 The lower courts concluded there was no in-
45. Id. at 851.
46. See id.
47. See generally Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
1749 (2014); Highmark, Inc. v. Alicare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct.
1744 (2014).
48. See Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1753.
49. See id.
50. Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012)).
51. See id.
52. See id. at 1754; Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int'l, Inc., 393 F.3d
1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Under a clear and convincing evidence burden, an
exceptional case occurs either where materially inappropriate conduct oc-
curred, or both subjective bad faith in bringing the suit and an objectively base-
less case was made).
53. Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1747
(2014).
54. Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1754.




fringement.57 The district court dismissed the infringement claim through
summary judgment,58 and dismissed Octane's motion for attorney's fees
finding that there was "no subjective bad faith on ICON's part."59 The Fed-
eral Circuit affirmed the rejection of awarding attorney's fees.60 The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari to determine the standard for an exceptional
case.6 1
The Supreme Court addressed whether "exceptional" under 35 U.S.C.
§ 285 can occur under two limited circumstances: "when there has been
some material inappropriate conduct, or when the litigation is both brought in
subjective bad faith and objectively baseless."62 The Court found that the
exceptional case standard should be more flexible because of the word's
common meaning is appropriate.63 The two categories of cases where the
Federal Circuit found fee awards to be appropriate tended to overlap other-
wise sanctionable conduct, or impermissibly limit the award of attorney's
fees.64 The Supreme Court was also concerned that the previous standard
"render[s] § 285 largely superfluous."65 Finally, the Supreme Court lowered
the burden of proof required to obtain attorney's fees to a preponderance of
the evidence standard.66 This standard permits a fairer allocation of the risk
of error to both parties.67
In the second case, Allcare Health Management System, Inc. (Allcare)
owned a patent covering a review method for managed health care systems. 68
Highmark, Inc. (Highmark), a health insurance company, sought a declara-
tory judgment of non-infringement.69 The district court granted summary
judgment and awarded attorney's fees for Highmark.70 The district court
found that Allcare was attempting to force Highmark into entering a license
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1755.
60. Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1755.
61. See id. at 1756.
62. Id. at 1752-53 (quoting Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int'l, Inc., 393
F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
63. See id. at 1756.
64. See id. at 1756-57.
65. Id. at 1758.
66. Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1758.
67. Id.
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agreement by asserting a subjectively frivolous claim and defenses.7' The
Federal Circuit affirmed the summary judgment on non-infringement, but re-
versed the ruling for attorney's fees because Allcare's claim of infringement
was not objectively baseless.72 The Federal Circuit determined de novo re-
view was appropriate when reviewing whether a claim is objectively base-
less.73 The Supreme Court then determined whether an appellate court should
give deference to the lower's courts findings when a suit is found to be ob-
jectively baseless.74 The Court found that because the statute requires the
district court to exercise discretionary power when awarding fees, the appel-
lant court must defer to the district court by "apply[ing] an abuse-of-discre-
tion standard in reviewing all aspects of a district court's § 285
determination."75
iii. Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc.
Akamai Technologies, Inc. (Akamai) was the exclusive licensee of a
patent owned by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.76 The patented
material was a method of storing components on a website.77 Limelight Net-
works, Inc. (Limelight) operated a website which allowed for storing compo-
nents on their website.78 Limelight performed all but one of Akamai's
patented steps and required a third party, its independent customers, to com-
plete the one step Limelight did not perform.79 Although the jury found an
infringement had occurred, the district court overruled the jury.80 After the
jury verdict, but before the judge issued the final verdict, a Federal Circuit
opinion was released, holding that control or direction over the third party
was required to find direct infringementSI
Akamai appealed before a Federal Circuit panel, which affirmed the dis-
trict court's judgment as a matter of law finding non-infringement.82 The
Federal Circuit en banc reversed the panel's ruling, holding that the proof
necessary to find direct infringement is not the same as the proof required to
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 1747.
74. See Highmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1746.
75. Id. at 1749.





80. Id. at 2116.
81. Id.
82. Limelight Networks, 134 S. Ct. at 2116.
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find only one party is liable for direct infringement.83 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to examine the scope of direct infringement.84
The question before the Supreme Court was whether a finding of in-
duced infringement was appropriate when no single party directly infringes
the patent.85 The Court determined that in order to find an infringement, there
must be some party, in the suit or otherwise, that directly performs all of the
claimed steps or elements of the patent.86 The Supreme Court observed that
Congress already provides explicit definitions to determine when inducement
results in liability without a direct infringement as seen in § 271(f).87 The
Supreme Court also noted that the lower courts should not expand the scope
of an infringement claim without authorization from Congress, i.e. authoriza-
tion similar to § 271(f).88 The concern that "a would-be infringer [could]
evade liability by dividing performance of a" patent does not justify altering
the infringement rules set out in the Patent Act.89
iv. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.
Biosig Instruments, Inc. (Biosig) was the assignee of a patent for moni-
toring heart rates during exercise.90 The invention calculated an accurate
heart rate when an individual gripped two cylinders "mounted . . . in spaced
relationship with each other."91 Biosig allegedly disclosed the invention to
StairMaster Sports Medical Products, Inc. (StairMaster).92 StairMaster then
incorporated the invention into the equipment it sold. 9 3 Later, Nautilus, Inc.
(Nautilus) purchased StairMaster.94 Nautilus continued to sell StairMaster
equipment, including the equipment allegedly incorporating the Biosig
invention.95
Biosig sued Nautilus for infringement. After claim construction, Nauti-
lus claimed the infringement suit was erroneous because the patent itself was
83. Id. at 211-17.
84. Id. at 2120.
85. Id. at 2115.
86. Id. at 2117.
87. Id. at 2118 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2012) (allowing one who supplies com-
ponents to produce an infringing device to be found liable for infringement)).
88. Limelight Networks, 134 S. Ct. at 2118.
89. Id. at 2120.
90. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2125 (2014).
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indefinite.96 The district court agreed with Nautilus, finding that the term
"spaced relationship" was indefinite because it did not inform any prospec-
tive user of the requirements for the term. 97 The Federal Circuit reversed and
held that a claim is only indefinite if "it is not amenable to construction or
insolubly ambiguous."98 The Supreme Court heard the case to examine the
Patent Act's definiteness requirement.99
In Nautilus, the Supreme Court addressed whether a finding of indefi-
niteness is permissible only when the claim is "[un]amenable to construction
or insolubly ambiguous."100 Congress permitted some uncertainty within the
claims in order to promote innovation, as determined by the Supreme Court's
interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 112;l0 however, a patent must inform the pub-
lic of its scope.1 0 2 The courts must prevent "a zone of uncertainty which
enterprise and experimentation may enter only at the risk of infringement
claims."l03 The Court held that the correct standard for patent indefiniteness
"require[s] that a patent's claims, viewed in light of the specification and
prosecution history, inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the
invention with reasonable certainty."104
v. Alice Corp. Proprietary Ltd. v. CLS Bank International
Alice Corporation Proprietary Company Ltd. (Alice) owned several pat-
ents involving financial risk management. 05 CLS Bank International (CLS
Bank) operated a system of currency transactions.106 CLS Bank filed suit
against Alice to obtain a declaratory judgment that invalidated Alice's pat-
ents.107 The district court found the patents invalid because they claimed an
abstract idea, but a panel of the Federal Circuit reversed, finding "that it was
not manifestly evident [the] claims are directed to an abstract idea."108 The
Federal Circuit heard the case en banc and determined the district court was
96. Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2126-27.
97. Id. at 2127.
98. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
99. Id. at 2125, 2128.
100. Id. at 2130 (internal quotations omitted).
101. Id. at 2128 (citing Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535
U.S. 722, 732 (2002)).
102. Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2129.
103. Id. at 2129 (citing United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228,
236 (1942)).
104. Id.
105. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014).
106. Id. at 2353.
107. Id.
108. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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correct. 0 9 The Federal Circuit determined the patents did not contribute sig-
nificantly more to than the abstract idea at issue.o10 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to examine the scope of patent eligible concepts."'
The Supreme Court sought to determine whether the claims concerning
an abstract idea could be non-invalid patents under 35 U.S.C. § 101.112 Gen-
erally, the concern for pre-empting future innovation prohibits patenting the
building blocks of innovation because they are generally considered abstract
ideas.11 3 Courts apply a two-part test to determine whether an invention
passes § 101.114 First, a court must determine the claims are written to en-
compass a patent-ineligible concept; then the court must consider whether
the invention transforms the "abstract idea into a patent-eligible inven-
tion.","1 The Court found the patent at issue in Alice failed to transform the
abstract idea because the claims merely required a plain computer implemen-
tation.116 "[M]ere recitation of a generic computer" does not transform the
subject matter.' '7 If such recitation were considered to be "transformative," a
sufficiently skilled draftsman could patent any building block of innova-
tion.118 The Court looked to the longstanding policy of preventing § 101 from
depending on the skill of the draftsman.' 19 As such, the Supreme Court found
that Alice's claims were not patent eligible.120
vi. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.
Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. (Teva) owned a patent covering the
manufacture of a drug, Copaxone.121 Sandoz, Inc. (Sandoz), among other
companies, tried to make a generic version of the drug.122 Teva then sued
Sandoz for infringement.123 During the claim construction hearing, Sandoz
contended that the phrase "molecular weight" rendered the claim indefi-
109. Id.
110. Id.
Ill. Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2354.
112. Id. at 2352.
113. Id. at 2354.
114. Id. at 2355, 2357.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2357.
117. Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2358.
118. Id. at 2359.
119. Id. at 2360.
120. Id.
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nite.124 The district court found the term to be sufficiently definite because
"molecular weight" referred to the weight of the most prevalent molecule.125
The Federal Circuit reviewed the claim de novo and found the phrase "mo-
lecular weight" indefinite.126 The Federal Circuit reversed the district court's
decision and found the patent invalid.127 The Supreme Court reviewed the
claim construction.128
The Supreme Court examined whether, on appeal, claim construction
fact-finding should be reviewed for clear error.1 29 When reviewing a patent
law claim construction, while the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply,130
the reviewing court should not ignore the district courts findings because
doing so would needlessly expand the number of appeals.131 Sometimes,
claim construction requires underlying factual determinations, such as find-
ing how specialized experts construe the claim.132
Treating a factual determination as a legal conclusion creates additional
problems.133 For example, affording deference to factual issues when the
claim construction is litigated could result in major issues being consoli-
dated.134 Cases that turn on extrinsic factual disputes should be afforded def-
erence on appeal.135 As the dissent acknowledged, preventing shifting patent-
right boundaries is vital to the patent system.1 36
B. Recent and Future Legislation
In 2011, Congress reformed procedural patent law.137 The America In-
vents Act (AIA) reduces the amount of litigation by increasing opportunities
of pre-issuance patent challenges.138 A third party can now challenge a pat-
ent's validity at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).139 Addition-
124. Id. at 836.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Teva Pharmals., 135 S. Ct. at 836.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 835.
130. Id. at 836-37.
131. Id. at 837.
132. Id. at 838.
133. See Teva Pharmals., 135 S. Ct. at 839.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 841.
136. Id. at 852 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
137. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).




ally, minor errors with a patent can no longer be used as a basis to invalidate
the patent.1 40 With the AIA, Congress intended to provide "greater trans-
parency, objectivity, predictability, and simplicity" to patent law.141
Since promulgating the AIA, Congress has introduced other patent-re-
form bills.142 Recently, Congress considered a bill entitled the Innovation
Act.1 43 If the Innovation Act is passed, two significant changes will occur:
there will be attorney-fee shifts and increased pleading requirements.144
While the bill initially failed, the House of Representatives reintroduced the
same bill in February 2015.145 The Innovation Act's reintroduction produced
mixed reactions.146 Both political parties in the House and some corporations
largely support the bill,147 but universities and other corporations oppose the
bill.148 The Senate never voted on the original bill, and the bill was removed
from the agenda.149
Congressman Goodlatte reintroduced the bill verbatim within a month
of the 2015 term. 50 Now with Congress's Republican majority, many legal
scholars and journalists believe that Congress will pass the bill, and the Presi-
dent will enact it.151 Recently, however, several groups have attempted to
block the Innovation Act before it reaches the floor for a vote.1 52 These
groups argue that the bill is overbroad and could increase patent litigation.153
140. See id. at 12.
141. Id. at 14.
142. See id.
143. H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 1(a) (2013).
144. Id. § 3(a)-(b).
145. Ashby Jones, Patent Reform Bill Arises Again in Congress, WALL ST. J. (Feb.
5, 2015, 12:42 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2015/02/05/patent-reform-bill-
arises-again-in-congress/.
146. Timothy B. Lee, Patent reform bill passes the house 325 to 91. Here's what





149. Arthur Gollwitzer III, Innovation Act Update, NAT'L L. REV. (Mar. 10, 2015),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/innovation-act-update.
150. H.R. 9, 114th Cong. (2015).
151. Conservatives increase pressure on congressional republicans to block patent
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Additionally, some commentators perceive the proposed legislation will
be overly burdensome on small business owners.1 54 However, others have
praised the bill as bringing an end to abusive practices by harmful NPEs.155
Presumably, it will be easy to comply with the bill's heightened pleading
standards.156 The new standard would not likely impose a great burden be-
cause in order to assert a patent infringement claim, a party must compare in
detail the infringing device to the public patent.
The Senate introduced a separate bill in 2015, which also addresses pat-
ent reform.157 The new bill is called the Support Technology and Research
for Our Nation's Growth (STRONG) Patents Act of 2015.158 Unlike the In-
novation Act, the STRONG Patents Act does not make any sweeping
changes; however, the STRONG Patents Act would heighten patent pleading
requirements.159 Congress made several findings of fact with regard to the
Act, including: "Congress finds that" any "efforts by Congress to reform the
patent system . . . [requires] careful scrutiny" to avoid the risk of harming the
patent system.1 60 The STRONG Patents Act would require "the 'plausibility'
standard under Iqbal and Twombly," in the unlikely event that the Judicial
Conference fails to heighten the pleading standard.161 However, this Act fails
to address the overall cost of patent litigation because "discovery is not lim-
ited to issues raised by the pleadings."62
C. Patent Litigation Cost on Society
It is undisputed that patent litigation, like all other types of litigation, is
generally costly. However, patent litigation is uniquely expensive for compa-
nies because of the level of indirect costs associated with patent litigation.163
These indirect costs include attorney's fees, threat of injunction, declined
154. Hannibal Travis, Patent Alienability and Its Discontents, 17 TUL. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 109, 137 (2014).
155. Thomas H. Kramer, Proposed Legislative Solutions to the Non-Practicing En-
tity Patent Assertion Problem: The Risks for Biotechnology and Pharmaceuti-
cals, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 467, 486-90 (2014).
156. Id. at 493.
157. See generally S. 632, 114th Cong. (2015).
158. See id.
159. See id. § 106.
160. Id. § 101(13).
161. The STRONG Patents Act of 2015, U.S. SENATOR COONS BLOG (Apr. 17,
2015), http://www.coons.senate.gov/patents.
162. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978).
163. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Private Costs of Patent Litigation, 9
J.L. EcON. & PoL'Y 59, 60 (2012).
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stock value, and loss of business opportunity.164 Attorney's fees average
across the board to cost $570,000.165 Overall, alleged infringers of a patent
lose a mean of $2.9 million as a result of patent litigation. 166 There is a per-
ception that NPEs cause a proportionately high level of cost to the patent
system.1 67 Some studies estimate that the annual cost of NPE litigation is $30
billion.168 While other legal scholars contest this high amount, a large amount
of money is indeed lost from litigation with NPEs.169
D. Public Opinion of NPEs
The public's perception NPEs is still very negative.170 A month into the
114th term of Congress, the House of Representatives introduced legislation
to reduce the ability of NPEs to litigate.171 One of the congressmen involved
with the bill has defined NPEs as "bottom feeding leeches."72 The perceived
problems with NPE litigation have spread from being localized to the In-
ternet, to pharmaceutical business, and even to non-technological busi-
nesses. 7 3 Even states' Attorneys General have weighed in on the issue by
advocating for reform.174
III. ANALYSIS AND SUGGESTED STEPS
It is clear that patent litigation in general has become a major issue in
society. Recently, President Obama summed up how to address the perceived
issues with the patent system by stating:
164. Id. at 60-62.
165. Id. at 60-61.
166. Id. at 62.
167. Mark. A. Lemley & Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forrest for the Trolls, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2119 (2013).
168. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 12, at 416.
169. See Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 16, at 434 ("First, we believe that Bessen
and Meurer's estimate is likely biased to be very high . .. We find flaws with
both the survey and the subsequent extrapolation").
170. Goldman, supra note 15.
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[O]ne of the biggest problems that we've been working on is how
do we deal with these folks who basically are filing phony patents
and are costing some of our best innovators tons of money in
court; or if they don't go to court, they end up having to pay them
off even though they're making a bogus claim just because it's not
worth it for you to incur all the litigation costs. 1 7 5
In addition to congressional involvement, the Supreme Court has become
involved in reforming patent law.176 The Supreme Court actively tightened
the requirements for both the issuance and litigation of patents.1 7 7
A. The Supreme Court's Effort to Reduce Patent Litigation
There are six issues that indicate the Supreme Court's active role in
limiting the litigation of weak patents. The Supreme Court has routinely pro-
duced rulings that are unfavorable to NPEs, even if some of the rulings harm
patent owners generally.178 Its decisions are in sharp contrast to those of the
Federal Circuit.179 Many scholars have criticized the Federal Circuit's inac-
175. Remarks by the President in a Town Hall on Innovation-Los Angeles, CA,
WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
2014/10/09/remarks-president-town-hall-innovation-los-angeles-califomia.
176. Two recent cases, Kimble and Commil, have addressed the issue of damages in
infringement suits. See Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015);
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015). In Kimble, the
Court upheld a rule where royalties stop accruing upon a patent's expiration.
Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2414. If the Court removed this bright line rule, courts
would be required to analyze the anticompetitive risks of extending the tempo-
ral length of the royalties;'an analysis that "produces notoriously high litigation
costs and unpredictable results." Id. at 2411. In Commil, the Court eliminated
the "defense of belief in invalidity" because the defense's existence would
"render litigation more burdensome for everyone involved." Commil, 135 S.
Ct. at 1929. Both cases expressly reduce the ambiguity when determining dam-
ages, which in turn reduces the expense of the initial trial and the likelihood of
an appeal over both issues.
177. Nisha Agarwal & Peter Root, The Supreme Court's part in patent reform, post-
AIA, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g
=69943534-0396-4e08-ba55-77d04ac31118.
178. See generally Teva Pharmals. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015);
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Limelight
Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Tech., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014); Nautilus, Inc. v.
Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014); Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare
Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014); Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON
Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014); Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski
Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014).
179. Anup Malalani & Jonathon S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases, 101
GEO. L.J. 637, 651 (Mar. 2013).
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tion to prevent the assertion of weak patents. 80 For example, several scholars
criticize the Federal Circuit, which handles the bulk of appeals in patent liti-
gation cases, for promulgating weak standards for patentability. 8
i. Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC
In Medtronic, the Supreme Court did not allow patentees to obtain an
advantage during a declaratory judgment action.182 Under the old Federal
Circuit standard, a patentee could obtain an advantage by causing an alleged
infringer to bring a declaratory judgment action.183 The Federal Circuit stan-
dard unfairly put the burden on the alleged infringer to prove that infringe-
ment was not present in their case.1 84 Moreover, the old standard discouraged
a licensee from challenging the validity of a patent because the licensee
would either be subject to a higher standard or an exorbitant infringement
judgment. 185Applying the uniform standard to patent law, as seen in other
types of civil litigation, the Supreme Court might have sought to prevent
NPEs from extorting other parties into obtaining and maintaining a license.
Under the Medtronic standard, a licensee merely has to bear the burden of
the litigation expenses if the licensee wants to challenge the validity of a
patent. 186
In addition, a patentee is unable to offensively use a judgment obtained
during a declaratory judgment action.'18 Under the old standard, a patentee
did not have the burden of proof in a declaratory judgment action.188 If the
alleged infringer failed to prove they did not infringe, the court would rule
for the patentee.1 89 In a later infringement action between the two parties, the
issue of infringement and validity would have to be re-litigated, even under
similar facts.190 Therefore, the old standard only encouraged high litigation
costs. The same issue would be litigated twice if the party bringing the suit
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. Medtronic, 134 S. Ct. at 846.
183. Id. at 847.
184. See id. at 850-51.
185. Id. at 850.
186. See id. at 851.
187. Id. at 849-50.
188. Because the declaratory judgment plaintiff is the only party seeking the aid of
the court in the circumstances presented here, that party must bear the burden
of persuasion." Medtronic Inc. v. Boston Sci. Corp., 695 F.3d 1266, 1274 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (rev'd and remanded by Medtronic, 134 S. Ct. at 846).
189. Medtronic, 134 S. Ct. at 849-50.
190. Id.
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differed.191 This threat of increased costs could be used as a further weapon
against allegedly infringing parties to encourage settlement.
Finally, the patentee now has the burden of proof, which in turn makes
the assertion of weak patents less favorable.192 The patentee has to show that
the patent is not invalid, demonstrate infringement, and no defenses apply to
the action, regardless of which party brings the case before the court.1 93 The
increased standard prevents the scope of the patent from being extended be-
yond its legally permissible scope.1 94
ii. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. and
Highmark Inc. v. AlIcare Health Management Systems
Inc.
In Octane Fitness, the Supreme Court expanded the ability of a district
court to award attorney's fees.195 The old Federal Circuit standard restricted a
district court's discretion to two circumstances.196 Further, the Federal Circuit
allowed the award of attorney's fees to be reviewed de novo, which gives the
losing party a second-chance to prove the alleged misconduct had not oc-
curred.197 The Supreme Court determined that an exceptional case should be
determined solely by the district court's discretion, and not whether a bright-
line rule applied.198
The increased ability for awarding attorney's fees discourages the asser-
tion of weak patents.1 99 Any litigant who brings a poor case into court can
now be subject to the additional penalty of attorney's fees.200 The district
court only has to determine that fees are appropriate by a preponderance of
the evidence.201 Previously, the claim had to be both subjectively and objec-
tively poor.202 Now, if one or the other is present alone, the district court can
award attorney's fees merely because they are more than likely to be
191. See id.
192. Id. at 846.
193. Id.
194. See id. at 851.
195. See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756
(2014).
196. See id. at 1754 ("[F]ees may be imposed against the patentee only if both (1)
the litigation is brought in subjective bad faith, and (2) the litigation is objec-
tively baseless") (internal quotations omitted).
197. Id. at 1747.
198. Id. at 1756.
199. See generally id. at 1749.
200. See id.
201. Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1758.
202. Id. at 1752.
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proper.203 The possibility of being penalized by attorney's fees will deter fu-
ture NPEs from asserting a weak patent through litigation.
Further, if a district court deems the award of attorney's fees to be
proper, the losing party does not have a second chance to prevent such a
judgment. When a district court awards attorney's fees, its decision is re-
viewed using an abuse of discretion standard.204 The NPE who is sanctioned
with attorney's fees would have to overcome a higher standard of clear and
convincing evidence on appeal. The higher standard on appeal further deters
an NPE from appealing judgments issued against them.
iii. Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc.
The Supreme Court prevented the scope of infringement from being im-
permissibly expanded.205 The old Federal Circuit standard allowed a court to
find infringement even if no one party directly infringed all of the claim's
steps or elements. 206 On appeal, the Supreme Court noted that, without con-
gressional authorization, the scope of a patent cannot be expanded.207
The Supreme Court prevented weak patents from being asserted against
clearly non-infringing behavior. This result was reached by barring infringe-
ment when no party performs or meets all of the steps or elements of pat-
ent. 20 8 If a patentee obtains a patent for an apparatus with six elements, the
patentee cannot claim a party, who only performs five elements, infringes.209
Within patent law, an ambiguous definition of infringement is impermissi-
ble.210 Here, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the drafter is responsible
for determining the scope of the patent.2 11 Because of the old maxim, contra
proferentem, a patentee is not entitled to more than what was claimed.212
203. See id. at 1756.
204. Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1747
(2014).
205. See generally Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Tech., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111,
2120 (2014) (discussing "natural consequences" of changing interpretation of
patent law).
206. Id. at 2116.
207. Id. at 2118.
208. See id. at 2117
209. See id.
210. Contra ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2506 (U.S. 2014) (discussing
a copyright law issue allowing infringement if a party's actions are substan-
tially similar to that of an infringer).
211. Limelight Networks, 134 S. Ct. at 2119.
212. 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Tredegar Corp., 725 F.3d 1315, 1336 (Fed. Cir.
2013) ("Cases like this-claim construction issues such as this one-may well
deserve application of a principle analogous to the contract doctrine of contra
proferentem").
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iv. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.
The Supreme Court increased the definiteness requirement to find a pat-
ent not invalid. The old Federal Circuit standard set a high bar for a claim to
be indefinite. Even though the Supreme Court acknowledged that some am-
biguity is allowed, a patent has to specify the scope of its claim.213 The Su-
preme Court sought to prevent uncertainty regarding a patent's scope. 2 14 Like
in Limelight, the public has to be informed as to what constitutes infringing
behavior of the claims.215
The Supreme Court prevented weak patents from being asserted against
clearly non-infringing behavior.216 If a patentee uses ambiguous language,
that patent cannot be asserted against another party.217 The definiteness re-
quirement requires all patentees to clearly inform the public as to the scope
of their patent.2 18 Once again, the Supreme Court emphasized the need to
avoid giving patents an uncertain scope at the expense of the public.219 Addi-
tionally, NPEs have a reduced incentive to litigate because they bear a higher
burden to prove infringement under this definiteness requirement. An NPE
takes on more risk when asserting a weak patent during litigation because
there is a greater potential that the patent will be found invalid.220 Any such
finding would prevent any current and future licensing opportunities.
v. Alice Corp. Proprietary Ltd. v. CLS Bank International
The Supreme Court reduced the availability of patents for business
methods and software codes. Although out of the recent cases, this case is the
only instance where the final ruling produced by the Federal Circuit was not
overturned, the Court still determined the Federal Circuit panel opinion was
incorrect.221 The Court affirmed that the benefits of the patent system must be
focused on spurring innovation and not on rewarding a skilled draftsman.222
213. See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2128 (2014).
214. See id. at 2129.
215. See Limelight, 134 S. Ct. at 2117 (explaining that a court must be able to assess
when a patent's rights have been invaded).
216. See generally Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2120.
217. See id.
218. See id. at 2124.
219. See id. at 2129.
220. Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting By Entrepreneurs: An Empiri-
cal Study, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 111, 126 (2010) ("However,
when the patents are weak, in the sense that the patentee is unlikely to prevail,
the patent system may not function optimally because of the uncertainty and
high costs involved in patent litigation").
221. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2353 (2014).
222. Id. at 2359.
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The Supreme Court stated that there must be some element of the invention
that contains a truly inventive concept.223 Additionally, a patentee is not al-
lowed to prevent future use of a business method or software code through a
patent.22 4 A patentee has to contribute something more than observation in
order to obtain a patent. 22 5
The Supreme Court decreased the potential that the future use of a pat-
ent will halt innovation. The higher standard increased the likelihood that a
third party will find a non-infringing alternative. The hurdle required by 35
U.S.C. § 101 was raised, which now requires that some inventive concept
become a part of the claims.226 The additional step frees up the underlying
idea and allows its application to other inventive concepts without the risk of
infringement. Further, the amount of patents that can be asserted against a
third party has been reduced. Patents claiming such a business method or
software code have now been invalidated.227 Because the pool of patents has
been reduced, businesses are now free to use ideas that were formerly being
asserted by NPEs.
vi. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.
The Supreme Court reduced the ambiguity of patents by examining pat-
ent standards on appeal. The new standard, which affords some deference,
prevents the issue of claim construction from being fully re-litigated upon
appeal.228 The proportion of claim construction issues requiring extrinsic evi-
dence to those that do not require extrinsic evidence is greater before the
Federal Circuit than the district courts. This is a result of the fact that highly
contested claims are likely to be more ambiguous. The Court reduced the
incentive for claim construction to be re-litigated on appeal because now the
district court's determinations as to expert testimony is analyzed using a
clear error standard instead of a de novo standard.229
The cost of patent litigation will likely be reduced as a result of the
Court's opinion. A third party being sued for infringement will not have as
great a concern that claim construction will be contested before the Federal
223. Id. at 2355.
224. Id. at 2354.
225. Id.
226. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (Any "new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof," is
patentable).
227. Daryl Lim, Standard Essential Patents, Trolls, and the Smartphone Wars: Tri-
angulating the End Game, 119 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 82 (2014).
228. See Teva Pharmals. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 839 (2015)
(citing multiple cases were "informal deference" was given to the lower court's
findings).
229. Id. at 835.
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Circuit.230 Therefore, an NPE with an arguably ambiguous claim will have
less incentive to go to trial because they do not have a true second-chance at
claim construction. Because the Federal Circuit will be less likely to overturn
claim construction of a district court, the NPEs will have less of an incentive
to appeal an unfavorable ruling. Previously, an NPE could always appeal an
unfavorable decision by a district court.
B. Reaction to the Supreme Court Rulings
Practitioners note that the recent Supreme Court rulings have reduced
the strength of the patentees. 231 Overall, the Supreme Court tightened the
scope of a patentee's rights to fall more in line with what is statutorily re-
quired. As one commentator put it, "2014 was a huge year for patent reform
... the Supreme Court [came out] with a string of promising decisions."232
The Court is seemingly working in unison with Congress to prevent the as-
sertion of weak patents by increasing the risk of claiming infringement with
such a patent. 2 33 According to Lex Machina, the Court has positively im-
pacted patent reform by contributing to the thirty-three percent reduction of
patent suits filed within the past year.2 34 The Court's recent rulings will aid
innovation by preventing the assertion of weak patents. 235
Now, the Supreme Court leads in increasing the quality of patents be-
cause of Congress' unwillingness to address patent law since the AIA was
passed in 2011.236 The Court lowered the ability of patentees to force a li-
cense upon another party. Licensors have been emboldened to challenge the
230. See id. at 837, 840 (noting that affording deference to factual issues allows
consolidation of a major issue, if appealed).
231. Stephen C. Holmes & Nicole Buck, Has Patent Reform Really Hurt the Patent
Trolls?, INSIDE COUNSEL (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2015/
03/02/has-patent-reform-really-hurt-the-patent-trolls.
232. Daniel Nazer, Big Patent Reform Wins in Court, Defeat (For Now) in Con-
gress: 2014 in Review, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Dec. 25, 2014),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/12/2014-review-big-patent-reform-wins-
court-defeat-now-congress.




235. See A Welcome Crackdown on Patents, L.A. TiMEs, June 20, 2014, http://
www.1atimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-patent-supreme-court-20140620-
story.html.
236. See Klint Finley, Supreme Court Deals Major Blow to Patent Trolls, WIRED,




issues of validity and infringement because of Medtronic's holding.237 The
Court reinforced a patentee's need to show that their patent is not invalid,
and that their patent does not infringe upon another party's device.238 Some
commentators even go so far as to recommend that patentees further examine
the strength of their patents before presenting them for licenses as a result of
the Court's ruling.239 This type of advice is exactly what the Court was at-
tempting to reinforce. Those asserting weak patents will have to think twice
before keeping licensees on the hook. "The high court has certainly put its
stamp on the hot-button issue on non-practicing entities suits . . . [the Su-
preme Court] 'makes it much more difficult to be an NPE.' "240
The Supreme Court allowed district courts to more readily sanction par-
ties asserting weak patents. The decisions in Octane Fitness and Highmark
make it substantially easier for a district court to award attorney's fees in
patent cases.241 This outcome should reduce the staggering increase in patent
litigation caused by NPEs. It is highly likely that the Court decided these
cases in such a manner because of the recently proposed legislation aimed at
making fee shifting easier for the district courts.2 42
This increased ability to be subject to fees not only deters NPEs from
asserting weak patents, but also encourages defendants to litigate an issue
through final judgment to invalidate the patent or end its assertion.243 Many
companies, including Apple and Google, support the Court's decisions.244
Prior to these decisions, there was a perception that businesses had no legal
237. See Donald Zuhn, Top Stories of 2014: #14 to #11, PATENT Docs (Jan. 1,
2015), http://www.patentdocs.org/2015/01 /top-stories-of-2014-14-to-Il.html.
238. See Jeremy Elman, 6 Key Decisions: Patent Year in Review, DAILY Bus. REV.
(Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.dailybusinessreview.com/id=120267918790616-
Key-Decisions-Patent-Year-in-Review?slreturn=20150112223447.
239. See Brian G. Arnold et al., Keeping Current: Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Fam-
ily Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014), Bus. L. TODAY, May 2014, http://
www.americanbar.org/publications/bltI2014/05/keeping?current?arnold.html.
240. Ryan Davis, 5 High Court Rulings Give Ammo to Patent Troll Opponents, LAW
360 (June 20, 2014), http://www.1aw360.com/articles/550296/5-high-court-rul
ings-give-ammo-to-patent-troll-opponents.
241. Andrew Williams, Patent Trolls Beware-Supreme Court Issues Decisions in




243. Steven J. Vaughan-Nichol, Patent Trolls Are Starting to Get Trampled, ZD
NET (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.zdnet.com/article/patent-trolls-are-starting-
to-get-trampled/.
244. Susan Decker, Patent Suit Losers Should Pay Victors' Legal Fees: SCOTUS,
BLOOMBERG Bus., Apr. 29, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2014-04-29/supreme-court-eases-rules-for-winners-to-collect-patent-fees.
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recourse when targeted by frivolous suits and as a result the companies were
stuck with having to pay their own legal fees.245 While this decision does not
go as far as some of the recently proposed patent reform legislation, it is seen
as a step in the right direction.246 As some commentators claim, NPEs are
able to survive because, for potentially accused infringers, it is cheaper to
settle than to litigate an issue.247 As a result, many commentators have ap-
plauded the decisions reached in Octane Fitness and Highmark.248
As a result of Limelight Networks, future patents will be further
strengthened as this decision urges that they be drafted towards one potential
infringer.249 The Court has increased the number of cases that a district court
can dismiss.250 The standard for inducement of infringement is now to the
point where such a pleading is nearly ineffective.251 Because many NPEs
assert method claims, the Supreme Court has substantially hindered the
power of NPEs.252 A defendant now has an easier time evaluating whether it
will win on the issue of infringement.253 No longer will a company be re-
sponsible for what occurs without its knowledge or approval, upstream or
downstream.254 Nonetheless, for those who have a proper inducement claim,
there is still the possibility that they will be victorious when asserting a
strong patent.255
Patents with vague language are more likely to be invalidated by the
courts. 2 56 NPEs are likely going to be deterred by such a change because they
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Daniel Nazer, FindTheBest Wins Again: Patent Troll Hit with Double Fee
Award, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, (Oct. 28, 2014), https://
www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/10/findthebest-wins-again-patent-troll-hit-double-
fee-award.
248. See generally Decker, supra note 244, at 32; see also Nazer, supra note 232, at
32; Williams, supra note 241, at 32.
249. MaryAnne Armstrong, A Close Look at High Court Decision in Limelight v.
Akamai, LAw 360 (June 2, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/543919/a-
close-look-at-high-court-decision-in-limelight-v-akamai.
250. Reza Mirzaie & Stanley M. Gibson, The Future of Inducing Infringement
Claims After Limelight v. Akamai, LEXOLOGY (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.lex
ology.comlibrary/detail.aspx?g=9c3f1 i b4-ebe4-4983-abbd-29Id7718bI2c.
251. Id.
252. Davis, supra note 240, at 31.
253. Reagan H. Charney, The Death of Induced Infringement (According to the Su-




256. Davis, supra note 240, at 31.
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formerly did not have to risk the patent being invalidated.257 The Supreme
Court has prevented the very uncertainty previously allowed that was
favorable to NPEs.258 By decreasing the efficacy of asserting a weak patent in
Nautilus, NPEs will have a harder time making an infringement claim.259
Even though the ruling of Alice Corp. is likely to reduce the strength of
a business's patent portfolio, the reaction has been largely positive.260 Some
legal scholars are worried that the incentive for innovation has been re-
duced. 26 1 However, as a lobbyist for the software industry put it, "[t]his deci-
sion is a victory for innovation."262 The decision will discourage the USPTO
from issuing weak patents. 263 While the decision itself does not prevent NPEs
from asserting weak patents, it does discourage NPEs from bringing infringe-
ment suits by similar weaker patents. 264 As a result, the NPEs are likely to be
kept in check as a result of the Supreme Court's ruling.265 Even software-
heavy Google has found that knocking down weak software patents is benefi-
cial for business.266 The Supreme Court thus prevented further repetition of a
problem that has plagued the technology business sector for years. 267
257. Id.
258. See Michael A. Sartori et al., United States: Supreme Court Aiding Fight
Against Patent Trolls: Alice, Nautilus, Limelight, Octane Fitness and
Highmark, MONDAQ (July 1, 2014), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/
324230/Patent/Supreme+Court+Aiding+Fight+Against+Patent+Trolls+Alice+
Nautilus+Limelight+Octane+Fitness+And+Highmark.
259. See Nazer, supra note 232, at 29.
260. See John K. Higgins, No Unanimity in Reactions to SC's Unanimous Software
Patent Decision, ECOMMERCE TIMEs (June 25, 2014), http://www.ecommerce
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Most scholars have reacted positively to Teva.268 Under the new stan-
dard, weak patents are less likely to be asserted because a weak patent owner
is more likely to be risk-averse.269 Overall, NPEs own a greater proportion of
weak patents within their overall patent portfolio when compared to the aver-
age business.270 As a result, preventing a second-chance on appeal will re-
duce the litigation costs associated with patent litigation.271 While it is
possible that some uncertainty will continue to exist at the district court level,
this standard goes a long way into reducing the chance that an NPE will be
found victorious upon a final judgment.272
It is clear from both evaluating the Supreme Court's opinions and the
reaction upon their issuance that the Supreme Court is attempting to curb
NPEs assertion of weak patents.273 The Supreme Court thus chose to become
a leader in patent reform, even though its reach is confined to statutory
interpretation.
C. Different Types of NPEs
The definition of an NPE is still debated today.274 The debate concerns
whether a "patent troll" is synonymous with an NPE, or whether patent trolls
are a mere subset of the broader NPE.275 "There is no consensus among re-
searchers on the proper definition of NPE."276 Legal scholars and common
sense dictate that an NPE is simply a patent owner that does not practice the
patented technology.277 Some NPEs are inherently good and advance the
overall wealth of innovation within the United States.278 These NPEs include
universities and small business owners that are unable to practice their inven-
tions because the costs are prohibitive, or because they lack the implementa-
268. Dennis Crouch, Giving Deference to the Supreme Court in Teva v. Sandoz,
PATENTLY-O (Jan. 21, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/20 15/01/deference-
supreme-sandoz.html.
269. John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent
Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 707-08 (2011).
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BLOOMBERG Bus. (Jan. 20, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articies/
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272. See Jones, supra note 261.
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tion capability.279 Nonetheless, other NPEs own patents solely in order to
profit.280 These profit-motivated NPEs are harmful to innovation and thus
should be the focus of regulation efforts in order to ensure that those NPEs
benefiting the public are not harmed.281
The behavior of harmful NPEs is nearly universally seen as having a
negative impact upon society because it is abusive and unproductive.282 As a
result, reform of the current patent system can be justified on constitutional
grounds, because of the NPE's harmful effect on the patent system and the
general public.283
Both Congress and the White House have cautioned that the current
system inadequately fights harmful NPE litigation.284 The House of Repre-
sentatives is attempting to produce more legislation to prevent this exact type
of negative litigation caused by some NPEs.285 This legislation has found
broad support from Republicans and Democrats, as well as business lobby-
ists.286 Even if the proposed legislation incidentally hampers the small busi-
ness owner, those involved believe that the abusive litigation is rampant
enough to justify the means. 28 7 This bullish attempt at combating harmful
NPEs may do more harm than good.
D. Targeted Reform Efforts
Attempting to attack trolls without examining the big picture issues may
end up hindering innovation.28 8 The abusive underlying conduct needs to be
focused, rather than directly attacking entities that do not practice their in-
ventions. 289 Simply deterring patent litigation generally would only exacer-
bate the problem.290 The normal means of deterring patent litigation increases
the risks of litigation and decreases the requirement for a patent to be found
invalid.291 Taking this to its logical conclusion, the only remaining actors in
279. See id. at 2124-25.
280. See id. at 2126-27.
281. See Kravets, supra note 274.
282. See Kramer, supra note 155, at 467, 472.
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patent law would be the harmful NPEs that have created an aggregated port-
folio, and the Fortune 500 companies because they are the only parties who
could absorb the rising costs. 29 2
Arguably, the Supreme Court's recent decisions have not harmed the
beneficial NPE. By increasing the baseline strength of patents required for
litigation, the Supreme Court is supporting the invalidation of the patents that
have caused a headache to defendants.293 Because the door was partially left
ajar in Teva, district courts may require extrinsic evidence to be heard in
order to avoid being overturned on appeal.294 Assuming the Federal Circuit
will separate review of evidence and the ultimate conclusion, any increase in
costs will be short lived. Such a conclusion is likely because the Federal
Circuit has consistently shown a desire to be the ultimate arbiter on patent
law issues.295
The alternative rulings in each of these cases likely persuaded the Su-
preme Court as well. Prior to these decisions, the patent system allowed for
growing amounts of litigation, exorbitant costs, and an assertion of weak
patents.296 However, in the end the current patent system may be preferable
because the prevention of harmful NPE practices may not be justifiable given
the harmful effects on innovation.297
E. Potential Next Steps
Whenever the Supreme Court or the Federal Circuit chooses to become
involved in patent reform, the courts should be aware of the means available.
The courts should remain cautious when making such rulings in case such a
ruling would prevent a future reform effort.
i. Broadening the NPE Market
If the law allows NPE practices to become commonplace, the free mar-
ket can positively reform harmful practices. In fact, copyright, another field
of intellectual property, already gives licensing entities free rein.298 The opin-
ions of groups such as the BMI and ASCAP are generally positive because
this free rein has decreased costs and increased licensing efficiency.299 Noth-
292. Id.
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struction, with U.K. and European comparisons, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 29, 2015),
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ing prevents the patent system from implementing a similar system. Inven-
tions produced by scholarly entities, such as universities, could be
represented by one entity, while another could represent inventions by small
business owners.300 Like the copyright licensing entities, the patent licensing
entities could offer a blanket license to large companies in order to prevent
any future litigation.301 Moreover, these entities could serve as a middleman
between the inventor and smaller companies seeking to license an individual
patent.302
The free market would regulate such entities because only those that
engaged in fair practices would be able to obtain licenses from other busi-
nesses. 303 The free market is notoriously frugal, and therefore would not be
willing to pay for any service that is not necessary. Further, inventors would
aim to obtain the best price offered for their patents. An increased investment
would require these entities to conduct a more detailed assessment as to the
patent's strength in order to justify the increased costs. Finally, these recog-
nized NPEs would become powerful enough to eventually eradicate the bot-
tom-feeding harmful NPEs out of the market place by an ability to pay more
for patents.304
As an additional benefit, large and recognized NPEs would prevent is-
sues that commonly occur between individual inventors and large companies,
such as patent holdups.305 A patent holdup occurs when a patent owner waits
until the alleged infringing technology has been implemented, or at least
heavily invested in, before bringing notice of infringement.306 This practice
causes the alleged infringer to be put between a rock and a hard place, as
they neither want to scrap the investments already made, nor do they want to
pay for litigation.307 For these reasons, a patent holdup is widely held to have
a negative effect on innovation.308 Patent holdout occurs when a corporation
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negotiations).
302. See id. at 20.
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is unwilling to pay royalties to a party because the costs associated with
litigation are prohibitive to the inventor.309 Some of the proposed solutions to
this problem include reducing forum shopping, encouraging early adjudica-
tion, and promoting economic proportionality between parties in a suit.310
Allowing more NPEs would address all of these issues. First, it would
reduce forum shopping. NPEs typically file cases near their location.311 After
the free market has consolidated the number of NPEs, there would be fewer
locations of NPEs and thus less disparity in where suits are brought. Second,
a more robust group of NPEs would be better able to provide notice on po-
tential infringement. A company creating a new product could easily discuss
whether the new product infringes any current patents through use of a non-
disclosure agreement with NPEs. Third, the increase in NPEs would prevent
the inventor from being economically dwarfed by the large corporation. A
small inventor would be greatly incentivized to assign his patent to an NPE
in order for the patent to be fully protected.
ii. Further Reducing Viability of Weak Patents
While the Supreme Court has addressed a lot of patent law issues within
the past several years, there remains more the Supreme Court can do. Possi-
ble further actions include increasing pleading standards within patent law to
mirror the pleading standards of antitrust actions and claims against the gov-
ernment, limiting the ability to claim NPE, and reducing the frequency of
increasing damage claims.
Increasing the pleading standards within patent law to mirror those re-
quired in antitrust actions and claims against the government could prevent a
harmful NPE from using increasing damage claims, through devices such as
attorney's fees and claims of willful infringement.312 Similar to an anti-trust
claim, a claim of willful infringement opens the door to costly litigation313
due to high discovery costs. 3 14 Limiting these burdensome litigation costs
would limit the ability to claim NPE in order to reduce the overall cost of
patent litigation and would be a step in the right direction by the Supreme
Court. Applying increased pleading requirements for damage claims could
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potentially triple the cost of a lawsuit for the losing party without preventing
a just result from being obtained.
The rights associated with a patent are exclusionary at heart and are not
meant to become a source of profit.315 Because increasing damage claims aim
to deter rather than incentivize, reducing their frequency would not affect
those rights.316 Additionally, small business owners would welcome any re-
duced risk of an expensive infringement ruling.
F. Criticism
i. Increasing the Market for NPEs
A likely concern of increasing the number of NPEs is that it would
multiply the existing problems within the current system. However, because
more NPEs result in more competition, that concern is short-sided. If the
number of NPEs increased, an inventor could select the NPE to sell their
patent rights. Currently, the market for sale of a patent does not exist; there-
fore, NPEs solicit sales from inventors. 3 17 By enabling inventors with a
choice, investors would choose to prevent abusive practices; thus, the free-
market would deter inventors from selling to NPEs of harmful reputations.318
Furthermore, under these market conditions, firms may be encouraged to
bring patents to trial on a contingent basis; thus, benefiting the public and the
patent system by allowing an inventor to selectively litigate their patent and
possibly putting more money in their pockets.
ii. Increasing the Pleading Requirements for Patent Suits
At first glance, practitioners may view tougher pleading requirements as
harmful to the patent system. However, upon closer inspection, practitioners
would see that the change does not affect substantive patent rights at all. If
the Court uniformly applies heightened pleading standards across all of pat-
ent law, all parties will be uniformly affected. A uniform application would
be ideal because it would lower the discovery costs of the alleged infringer.
Instead of conducting discovery in order to determine the specific claims
being made by the patentee, this information will be provided directly to the
defendant in the pleadings. Because this requirement may proportionately
315. See WiAV Solutions LLC v. Motorola, Inc., 631 F.3d 1257, 1264-65 (Fed. Cir.
2010).
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increase the cost of bringing an infringement suit, in lieu of raising the plead-
ing requirement across the board, the pleading requirements could be raised
for only the increased damage provisions-attorney's fees and willful
infringement.
While the heightened standard may affect the dollar-value of a judg-
ment, it neither prevents a just result nor the ability for a wronged party to
recover. In the case of an infringement claim, a patentee can still obtain rem-
edies of lost profits or a reasonable royalty.319 Also, because the increasing
damage statutes are meant to be offered in exceptional cases, 320 this can still
occur if a party has evidence wrongful conduct has occurred.
IV. CONCLUSION
Given the negative portrayal of NPEs in the media and the amount of
litigation within the patent field, the Supreme Court has effectively taken a
stand against NPEs. The Supreme Court wants to limit the role of NPEs in
order to bring the patent system closer to its intended purpose. While some of
the focus of the Supreme Court may have been on the NPE, the Court should
continue to reform the patent system overall. The need for reform within the
patent system ensures the Supreme Court's focus is not misplaced.
The government has focused on reforming patent law since before 2011.
The AIA does not seem to prevent the growth of patent litigation. However,
this opinion is premature because the overwhelming majority of existing pat-
ents are not subject to the changes created by the AIA. Therefore, the Su-
preme Court likely has begun implementing some of the policies behind the
AIA in their legal opinions. For instance, patents issued under the previous
rules were not uniformly altered by the AIA but the precedent established by
the Court uniformly affects all patents.
Congress remains focused on reforming patent law even after the enact-
ment of the AIA. Despite approval of the Innovation Act by the House of
Representatives, Congress has not passed any new patent laws since the ma-
jor changes created by the AIA. Consequently, legal scholars and judges
have become aware of the issues perceived with the current law. The preva-
lence of these issues likely spurred the Supreme Court to take action.
The opinions issued in 2014 and 2015 by the Supreme Court reformed
many areas of patent law. The Court's changes include: (1) keeping the bur-
den of proof in a declaratory judgment action on the patentee; (2) making the
assignment of attorney's fees fair; (3) preventing an expansion of liability for
indirect infringement; (4) expanding the test for definiteness to invalid pat-
ents; (5) refining the test for patent eligible subject matter; and (6) preventing
claim construction from issuing an unfair result upon appeal. All seven of the
opinions discussed within this Comment are steps in the right direction. The
319. See Nutting, 69 F. App'x at 457.




Supreme Court made it more difficult for bad patents to issue, be used in
litigation, and used in negotiations. Effectively, the Supreme Court increased
the likelihood of a bad patent either being invalidated or punished as a result
of frivolous pleading.
However, there are even further steps the Court can take to reduce prac-
tices frowned upon by the general patent community. NPEs that use bad pat-
ents as a weapon are harmful, and the Court can still issue rulings to weaken
that weapon. If the law allows NPEs to increase in numbers, the free market
would regulate and ultimately prevent harmful NPEs from flourishing. In-
stead of focusing on whether an entity practices the invention, the Court
could focus on whom the entity represents. Moreover, NPEs that merely re-
present inventors on a contingent basis should have the ability to litigate.
Preventing NPEs from suing effectively reduces the incentive to file for
a patent because a small business owner's return would be minimal. Small
business owners already have difficulty licensing their patents. Therefore,
preventing suits by all NPEs would eliminate the possibility of a small busi-
ness owner profiting from a patent altogether. Accordingly, a small business
owner would be prevented from selling their patent or getting an NPE for
litigation.
Furthermore, the Court's ability to alter pleading requirements without
congressional authorization is not unprecedented. Previously, the Supreme
Court increased pleading requirements for both anti-trust suits and suits
against the government. The Court could expand these heightened pleading
requirements to the patent context as well because patent suits and anti-trust
suits both have a long and expensive discovery process. Alternatively, the
Court can selectively alter certain patent pleadings. If the Court increases
pleading requirements for only attorney's fees and willful infringement, a
positive effect will be observed. Preventing the prevalence of these increased
damages pleadings from patent law will lower the negotiating ability of a
harmful NPE.
The Supreme Court has taken a direct role in the reformation of patent
law. The Court's decisions, whether intentional or not, directly aim to reduce
the number of harmful NPEs in the marketplace, which positively affects
patent law.
Further, arguments that the Supreme Court's decisions were harmful are
unsupported by the evidence. Patent law reform can take place through both
the judicial process and the legislative process. Legislators and the Supreme
Court alike should be aware of the effects that new laws and opinions will
have on future patent holders. Although there are several steps the govern-
ment can take to reform patent law, the best option may be through the judi-
ciary. Both the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court have the ability to
positively impact patent law without requiring approval from the other two
branches of government. Ultimately, instead of narrowly focusing on patent
trolls as they are reported in the news, the courts should view the problems of
the patent system more generally.
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